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Clausewitz first, and last, and always: War, 
strategy and intelligence in the twenty-first century 
R. Gerald Hughes with Alexandros Koutsoukis 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Christopher Daase and James W. Davis (eds), Introduction by James W. Davis, Clausewitz 
on Small War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. viii+252. Hbk. £58. ISBN: 
9780198737131. 
 
Christopher Coker, Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2017), pp. xiv+188. Pbk. £15.99. ISBN: 9781849047142. 
 
[I]n war more than any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature 
of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must 
always be thought of together…I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, 
literary definition of war, but go straight to the heart of the matter, to the 
duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to 
make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a 
pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do 
his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him 
incapable of further resistance. 
 
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to opponent to do our will. 
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of art and 
science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible 
limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and 
custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force - that is, physical force, for 
moral force has no existence saw as expressed in the state and the law – is 
thus the means of war, to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To 
secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, 
is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding 
it as something not actually part of the war itself.  
 
Carl von Clausewitz, Book One: ‘On the Nature of War’, On War.1 
 
In 2009, US Army General Stanley McChrystal2 ordered his chief of intelligence in 
Afghanistan, one General Michael Flynn,3 to assess the situation on the ground there. This 
came in the wake of a highly critical report by RAND (prepared for the US Joint Forces 
Command in November 2008) which had embarrassed the newly-installed Obama 
administration by its exposure of glaring failures in US intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In a curious echo of Vietnam,4 one anonymous source quoted by the RAND report opined 
that ‘operational commanders…indulge in the fallacy of body counts, and a month in which 
more Taliban are killed than in the previous month…is actually more likely to reflect the fact 
that there are more enemy on the battlefield than there were before.’5  Worse, another 
source noted that: ‘The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA [Central 
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Intelligence Agency], and the CIA was not listened to. . . I had my most depressing 
discussions with the intelligence people who could see what this was leading to’.6  The 2009 
report subsequently prepared at McChrystal’s behest was similarly scathing as Flynn and his 
two co-authors were unsparing in their excoriation of previous US intelligence efforts in 
Afghanistan.  
 
[E]ight years into the war in Afghanistan the U.S. intelligence community 
is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the 
overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brain-power 
on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer 
fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied 
forces operate.7  
 
In 2010 Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia 
University, published a celebrated book about intelligence failure.8 While Jervis 
acknowledged that the US Intelligence Community’s (IC) strong point was its ability to 
convey a great deal of information to policymakers quickly and concisely he, was, 
nevertheless, struck by ‘the bland writing style that often buries the important [points]’. This, 
Jervis posited, inhibited analysis through opacity.9 In essence, both Flynn and Jervis 
highlighted two central problems: viz. the reduced strategic relevance of the US IC; and 
exactly how intelligence agencies deal with the inevitable uncertainty in their line of work. 
Intelligence agencies could do worse than look to the thinking of the Prussian strategist, Carl 
von Clausewitz (1780-1831). War was famously defined by Clausewitz as ‘a continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means.’10  This has become a globally-recognised 
maxim although its variants are legion. (Henry Kissinger, for instance, once identified Lenin's 
approach as turning Clausewitz's argument ‘on its head’ with politics as a continuation of war 
by other means).11 In the lead-up to the Gulf War of 1991 the strategist Edward Luttwak, a 
then fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that the Clausewitzian 
focus on objectives was a crucial strength. ‘It’s a much more mature consideration of war. 
Instead of saying what are my resources and how do I best manage them, you say to yourself, 
what is the nature of the enemy, how do I best cope with him, what happens if I win?’12 For 
Peter Paret, Clausewitz’s real strength as a philosopher of war, and the main reason for his 
endurance as a thinker, lay in his ability to combine ‘reality and theory’ in such an effective 
manner.13 In 2016 Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, author of a biography of Clausewitz’s 
influential wife,14 opined that 
 
Carl von Clausewitz is known today as the West’s most influential 
military thinker. His seminal treatise On War lies at the heart of modern 
military doctrine. One recent article even compared its status among U.S. 
officers to that of St. Paul’s letters among Christians.   
 
For generations of readers of On War, Clausewitz, the private man, has 
been of a bit of mystery. Contemporaries noted that he was reserved and 
spoke freely and genially in the company of good friends. Although a 
veteran of many battles and campaigns, Clausewitz often avoided directly 
citing his own experience in his writings. Only recently his military 
achievements became the subject of an extensive study, found largely in 
Donald Stoker’s Clausewitz: His Life and Work.15 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
Such endorsements are, however, far from universal and critics of Clausewitz are numerous. 
Indeed, any number of commentators and scholars who have long since denied that 
Clausewitz has any relevance today. In this category, notable sceptics of the value of 
Clausewitzian thought have included notables such as Sir Basil Liddell Hart16 (who blamed 
Clausewitz for the horrors of the First World War)17 and Sir John Keegan.18 Clausewitz has, 
of course, always had his defenders, as well as his detractors. In 1994, Liddell Hart’s deep 
animosity towards Clausewitz even elicited the following response from Christopher 
Bassford. ‘Rather like Cato the Elder, ending every speech with his famous “delenda est 
Carthago,”19 the British historian, strategist and journalist Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970) 
routinely included in his many publications a ringing denunciation of the Prussian military 
philosopher Carl von Clausewitz.’20 Today, with Clausewitz more widely-read than ever, 
such arguments, often including exchanges littered with sharp attacks and ripostes, show no 
sign of abating in the near future. 
 
The late Michael Handel, an outstanding scholar of military thought, identified the clear 
lineage between the Sun Tzu,21 Machiavelli,22 Jomini23 and Clausewitz.  Handel argued ‘that 
the logic of strategy and waging war is universal rather than parochial, cultural, or 
regional.’24  By the latter part of the nineteenth century what Handel terms a ‘classical 
strategic paradigm for the understanding and direction of war’ had emerged out of the works 
of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Jomini.  These Handel summarised this in six 
points.  First, since war serves the political interest, it must always be controlled at the 
highest level by the political elite - and not the military.  Second, war should neither be the 
first nor the last resort of any given political community.  On occasion, it provides the 
optimum means for advancing the interests of such a community.  Third, wars should be 
fought with clear goals and employ a cost/ benefit analysis.  Ideally, they should thus be won 
as quickly as possible for the lowest possible material outlay.  Fourth, there are limitations on 
the rationality that can be brought to bear in terms of the analysis of the conduct of wars.  
Indeed, given factors like emotion and ideology, wars can even be fought rationally for non-
rational ends.  Fifth, wars cannot be won simply in military terms: political and diplomatic 
factors must continue to play a role even after the onset of hostilities.  Sixth, Handel’s 
paradigm is based upon the observation of human nature and a reading of human history. It is 
pessimistic, accepting that war can never be abolished (although some wars can be prevented) 
and that violence is an integral part of the relationships between nations.25 And Clausewitz 
should not be taken either out of context or out of his time. Clausewitz was undoubtedly 
influenced by the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), famous for his advocacy 
of peace. Yet it was Kant who, despite having famously written an essay entitled Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch26 - which proposed a peace programme for states everywhere, 
recognised a ‘certain malevolence is rooted in human nature’ that was ‘quite undisguisedly 
and irrefutably obvious in the external relation[s] of states to one another’.27 Despite this, in 
the popular mind, it is held that Kant advocated perpetual peace whilst Clausewitz favoured 
war-making as the primary rationale of state policy. In truth, while we recognise that Kant 
believed in the possibilities derived from the ‘rational agent’s ability to cognize and act’,28 
too many of us still conceive of Clausewitz as the ‘Mahdi of Mass’.   
 
Far from advocating war, as his detractors have often claimed, what lay at the centre of all of 
Clausewitz’s thinking and writings was a recognition of the inherent link between war and 
politics. He himself recognised the implications of all of this. And Clausewitz therefore 
wisely cautioned that even military victory is rarely final as the ‘defeated state often 
considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in 
political conditions at some later date.’29 Demonstrating his belief in the  indivisibility of war 
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and politics, Clausewitz observed of Sweden’s Charles XII (r. 1697-1718): ‘[he] is not 
thought of as a great genius, for he could never subordinate his military gifts to superior 
insights and wisdom, and could never achieve a great goal with them’30 The deficiencies of 
Charles XII in respect of failing to recognise the essential politically nature of war are 
summed by his declaration to the effect that ‘Gentlemen, I have resolved never to start an 
unjust war but never to end a legitimate one except by defeating my enemies.’31 
 
Clausewitz first drew a distinction between what he would later term ‘limited’ and ‘absolute’ 
war in 1804. For Clausewitz this meant, respectively, those wars fought to obtain favourable 
peace terms and those fought with the aim of destroying the enemy’s political independence 
(seine Staatenexistenz aufzuheben).32 Napoleon, Clausewitz observed, had a ‘plan of 
operation in wars’ that aimed to ‘beat the enemy – to shatter him – to drive the enemy into 
the last corner of the empire – and then, when the confusion was fresh, to dictate a peace’.33 
Within this paradigm, the notion of small wars could be assigned to either the ‘limited’ and 
‘absolute’ category, dependent upon specific circumstances. The nature of contemporary 
conflict confirms the continued utility of Clausewitz’s thinking on small wars makes the 
publication of the first English language edition of Clausewitz’s Lectures on Small War and 
other writings on small unit warfare,34 particularly timely. In Clausewitz on Small War 
Christopher Daase and James W. Davis35 have translated and edited the most important texts 
devoted to the analysis of asymmetric, unconventional, guerrilla, and small unit warfare. It is 
clear from reading Clausewitz on Small Wars that, while Clausewitz’s reputation as a theorist 
of classic inter-state conflict is well-deserved, he was also a highly original thinker in the 
realms of small wars and all forms of asymmetric warfare (including guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism).36 Clausewitz on Small Wars is an important collection and, after an excellent 
introductory piece by one of the editors,37 comprises the following: ‘Lectures on Small War, 
held at the War College in 1810 and 1811’;38 the ‘Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)’ of 
1812 (which called for a national war of liberation against Napoleonic France);39 ‘On the 
political advantages and disadvantages of the Prussian institution of the Landwehr’ from 
1819 (an assessment of the effectiveness of the Landwehr, a citizen militia that operated with 
the Prussian army after having been established on 17 March 1813);40 and, finally, ‘The 
arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung)’ from 1832.41 In the lectures on small war that 
comprise the bulk of this collection gives us great insights into the origins of the book Vom 
kriege as Clausewitz the career soldier turns his attention to recent military developments. Of 
course, at this time Prussia was a defeated state and an ally of Napoleon, albeit a reluctant 
one.42 In such circumstances, the Prussian War Academy naturally turned to self-reflection 
and practical military matters (as did the Reichswehr and Hans von Seeckt following Imperial 
Germany’s defeat in 1918). Clausewitz on Small Wars shows Clausewitz at his pragmatic and 
prescriptive best – seeking to prepare future generations of soldiers to best prepare for the fog 
and friction of war prior to their being actually engaged in war themselves.  
  
Should anybody doubt whether Clausewitz could tell us any more about small wars, they 
would be well advised to read Christopher Coker thoughts on the matter in his new book, 
Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century.43 In Rebooting Clausewitz Coker, a 
professor at the London School of Economics, weighs into the debates on Clausewitz on all 
fronts. As a reconsideration of strategic thinking, Rebooting Clausewitz bears all of his 
familiar stamps. It incorporates, and engages with, the most up-to-date scholarly literature. It 
is pithily argued - in considerably less than 200 pages - and iconoclastic. Chapter four of 
Rebooting Clausewitz demonstrates the utility of the approach outlined by in the preceding 
chapter by means of comparative ‘strategy’ case studies: viz. ‘What went wrong in Iraq and 
Afghanistan’. Coker’s book is far from a straightforward assessment of the much-debated 
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subject of the contemporary relevance of Clausewitz. Coker asserts that, despite his notoriety, 
the role of politics in Clausewitz’s worldview has never been accorded due prominence.44 
And yet, Clausewitz was unequivocal on the point that it is through political means that wars 
can be controlled and limited.45 He approached, then, what we, roughly speaking, would call 
the political ideology identified as ‘realism’ today.46 This interpretation of the issue might not 
be appealing for those of us who remain committed to general moral principles to judge war 
regardless of place or time. But Clausewitz’s central insight about the role of politics in 
preventing the escalation of conflicts and putting limits to military action might still be very 
useful. As Coker shows, despite his widespread fame, this role of politics in Clausewitz has 
not been seriously considered (not even in connection with contemporary conflicts.47 That 
said, Coker is well aware of the mythologies that have grown up around the person of 
Clausewitz and On War. In one of the more notorious myths, he notes that Hitler is often 
supposed to have been a keen devotee of Clausewitz and his work although we should be 
‘eternally grateful’ that Hitler got the Prussian philosopher of war all wrong.48 As a work of 
deconstructive analysis, Coker’s book has two original takes on On War. First, Coker peels 
the veneer of the Kantian teleological elements from Clausewitz, and transforms him into a 
Darwinist. This is recognition that war serves a Darwinian function. That said, Coker posits 
that the relationship between war and Darwinism means that, as Clausewitz predeceased the 
relevant scientific discoveries, his theory is incomplete.49 Second, Coker writes for a broader 
audience, careful not to exclude those unfamiliar with Clausewitzian ideas (former US 
Secretary for Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for instance, was supposedly unaware of the concept 
of the ‘centre of gravity’).50 
 
In an important recent book Thomas Waldman examined post-Cold War debates over 
Clausewitz’s continued relevance in the face of onslaughts from the ‘new war’ theorists, 
proponents of ‘non-Trinitarian’ warfare’, and the technological determinism of the extreme 
proponents of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).51 Waldman argued that anti-
Clausewitzians tended to base their case against Clausewitz on popular secondary readings 
which do inaccurately portray the meaning and utility of the Trinity. Against this, enthusiasts 
for Clausewitzian thinking have often downplayed the extent of change in warfare since 
Clausewitz’s time, often because of the anachronistic parts of Clausewitz’s writings (on 
cavalry, for example). Waldman asserts that the admirers of Clausewitz need not fret: indeed, 
the entire theoretical framework of Clausewitz can be readily adapted to rapid and radical 
change.52 In Rebooting Clausewitz, Coker sets about making his (Clausewitzian) case in 
innovative and refreshing ways. This original approach has Carl von Clausewitz himself 
dismantling the big fads of today: these include ‘new wars’, ‘big data’, and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). In doing this, Coker is seeking to address recent critics of 
Clausewitz in an engaging and lively manner, warning against judging people long in their 
grave by means of contemporary mores.53   
 
Michael Handel’s view of the universality of ‘the logic of strategy and waging war’54 is a 
widely-held view (shared, for instance, by Mao Zedong).55 There are, of course, certain 
constants in the study of war but, as Clausewitz noted, ‘every age had its own kind of war, its 
own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.’56 Yet this flexibility has not 
rendered Clausewitz invulnerable to the charge of his advancing obsolete ideas. The changes 
wrought in society - that have caused Clausewitzian thought to be superseded – have been  
seen to lead to what is termed ‘new wars’ by Mary Kaldor (like Coker hailing from the 
London School of Economics). This label was deemed to be a response to the transformation 
wrought in ‘organized violence’ in the last decades of the twentieth century.57 In 2010, 
Kaldor asserted her belief in the redundancy of certain aspects of Clausewitz’s thinking thus:  
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The notion of absolute war, the inner tendency of war to lead to extremes, 
which I regard as the core of Clausewitzean theory, is no longer applicable. 
For Clausewitz, war was fundamentally about the ‘urge to decision’, which 
was achieved through fighting, that is to say combat between two warring 
parties, and this implied the need for speed and concentration; the 
suspension of belligerent action and the dispersal of forces did, of course, 
take place but were explained in terms of departures from the inner nature 
of war. Today’s wars, by contrast to the European wars of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, are inconclusive, long lasting and have a tendency to spread. My 
argument is that this is because these wars have a different inner nature. In 
this sense, a Clausewitzean understanding of these wars can be deeply 
counterproductive in developing appropriate international strategies both 
for trying to end these wars and for the role of military forces.58 
 
Refuting such thinking James W. Davis asserts that critics of Clausewitz see his work as 
being limited by virtue of its ‘time-bound framework’ for analyses. Clausewitz’s approach, it 
is argued, fails to ‘anticipate forms of warfare beyond the rather symmetric pitched battlefield 
exchanges of large regular armies – the “old wars” that are said to have characterized his own 
times.’ Davis argues that much of the criticism is misplaced as commentators often 
mistakenly attack versions of Clausewitzian thought produced by individuals other than 
Clausewitz himself. Further, many critics of Clausewitz have been limited to his works 
available in the English language and relied too heavily on the ‘unfinished work On War’.59 
In 2017 Jack Levy observed of Clausewitz critics Kaldor and Van Creveld: 
 
Some interpret Clausewitz as arguing that war involves the use of state 
armies as an instrument of state policy and conclude that Clausewitz has 
little to say about insurgencies, guerrilla war, and other forms of violence 
by non-state actors. Van Creveld, for example, defines Clausewitz’s trinity 
as ‘the people, the army, and the government’ and concludes that 
Clausewitz cannot explain insurgencies or other forms of ‘nontrinitarian’ 
warfare.60 Similarly, Mary Kaldor claims that ‘war, in the Clausewitzean 
definition, is war between states for a definable political end, i.e., state 
interest,’ and concludes that Clausewitz can explain ‘old wars’ but not ‘new 
wars.’61 
 
This interpretation of Clausewitz in strictly statist terms is quite misleading. 
Although Clausewitz refers to the people, the army, and the government, he 
does so only after first identifying the ‘dominant tendencies’ of war in the 
form of the ‘remarkable trinity’ of primordial violence, chance, and the 
subordination of war to policy.62 This trinity is eternal and unchanging 
across time and space.63 
 
Even Kaldor does, however, recognise the continued value of certain portions of Clausewitz’s 
thinking. And she acknowledges that Clausewitz’s influence is such, that ‘new wars’ can 
‘only be defined in contrast to what went before and our understanding of what went before 
depends heavily on what we learn from reading [Clausewitz’s] On War.’64 Coker’s book 
involves the application of Clausewitzian ideas to the contemporary world by integration of 
such concepts as ‘big data’65 into the great Prussian thinker’s worldview. Coker constructs 
three fictional scenarios. First, Clausewitz is placed in a seminar at the United States Military 
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Academy (USMA) at West Point (where he asserted that his work is ‘Kantian’);66 second, he 
debates the course of post-2001 ‘War on Terror’ at an imaginary think-tank in Washington 
DC; and, third, participates in a lively seminar on the Hegelian-type debate on the utility of 
reading history.67 This third exchange is situated at a meeting of the Military History Circle 
in London. These three essays locate Clausewitz across the centuries, deconstruct and analyse 
his philosophy of war. Coker is not offering a hagiography of Clausewitz. Instead, he argues 
that the advances in evolutionary psychology and neuroscience made since Clausewitz’s 
death in 1831, vindicate and even expand Clausewitz’s view of war. What is clear is that, 
even though he was unaware of them, Clausewitz’s theories have proved remarkably resilient 
in the face of the major technological developments that have occurred since his death. This 
is an important and novel argument that Coker advances in crystalline fashion, having 
developed his thinking through a series of publications that include the books, Can War Be 
Eliminated? and Future War.68  
 
Coker’s work is part of the latest wave of a renaissance in Clausewitzian studies; his 
accessible style will make Clausewitz accessible to a wider audience. In his first chapter, 
Coker argues that Clausewitz was both in tune with his times and able to transcend them. 
This paradox creates the book’s impetus and the rationale to examine Clausewitz’s greatest 
preoccupations: how to win wars and what is the relationship between war and logic. To 
equip himself mentally for such questions, Clausewitz recognised and acknowledged the 
utility of unifying theories. Contrary to the opinions of many of his detractors Clausewitz was 
not a militarist, even though he was in love with war. He saw war as something that resided, 
however unfortunately, in the human condition. The business of the strategist was to 
ameliorate the impact of this ‘very imperfect political instrument’,69 by seeking to minimise 
its duration and the effects on the society from which the strategist emerged. This necessitates 
a proper understanding of the relationship between political ends and military means in any 
given state and/or collection of states bound in alliance.    
 
It is axiomatic that winning requires a proper understanding of war. This, in turn, requires a 
theory of war-fighting. This is the focus of Coker’s chapter two. And Coker’s re-born 
Clausewitz is openly critical of a great deal of contemporary military theory. Such theory 
tends to focus on information but is thin on substance. Determined to avoid wasteful 
distractions, in his West Point seminar Clausewitz repeats his maxim that war remains, 
fundamentally, ‘an act of violence to compel an enemy to do our will’. This simple 
formulation belies the fact that there exists a variety of victories, and different modes of will 
and assorted clashes of combatant will.70 Clausewitz’s trinity casts the nature of war as the 
interplay of three fundamental elements: reason, passion, and chance.71 Coker does a 
particularly enlightening job in illuminating the ineradicable complexity of emotions that 
correlates with the changing culture of societies, and the increasing number of actors,72 which 
greatly complicate the conduct of modern war. The expanding complexity of the world today 
is a stimulus to good Clausewitzian analysis rather than the other way around. To attain 
victory, one must understand the relationships between these elements, the continuities and 
differences in war, and then see how they shape the conflict at hand. It all comes back to the 
need for a unifying theory of everything. In short, to know what kind of intelligence to 
collect, what type of strategy to design, you need a theory. In Rebooting Clausewitz, Coker, 
intriguingly, favours a combination of Darwin and Clausewitz as offering for what he sees as 
optimum theoretical model. 
 
In chapter three of Rebooting Clausewitz (entitled ‘What if Clausewitz had Read Darwin?’), 
Coker argues that Clausewitz’s thinking was primed for a Darwinian approach. Coker 
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disagrees with authors like Martin van Creveld (whose 1991 book On Future War was 
advertised as ‘The most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz’)73 and 
their belief in the outdated nature of On War.74 Neither has Coker much time for certain 
authors, like the American strategist-economist Thomas Schelling,75 who assume that ‘cool-
headed’ behaviour ordinarily underlies threats and responses. Coker’s Clausewitz posits that 
‘war is a continuation of politics by other means but is not hostile to culture: politics is 
actually its sub-text’.76 His view of culture is Darwinian and, accordingly, emotions are both 
psychological and cultural. War is thus embedded in an evolutionary process. This 
evolutionary process, whilst influenced in part by biology, is ultimately cultural (and not to 
be confused with the notion of ‘Social Darwinism’ that was once so fashionable).77 This is 
Coker’s way of marrying the diachronic in human history with the dynamic character of our 
societies. In a section where Coker revisits Clausewitz’s phenomenology of war (his analysis 
of the origins, mechanisms, ontogeny, and functions of war) is a real tour de force that 
surpasses the original.78 Less dynamic approaches than Coker’s will, in future, come up 
short. In this sense, Coker’s work is scientific. For some readers, this process will be more 
seductive than that adopted by, for instance, the eminent military historian Sir Michael 
Howard, whose deconstruction of strategic epochs focused rather more on careful historical 
analysis.79 
 
Coker’s Darwinist propositions address one of the biggest criticisms that the US Intelligence 
Community (IC) has faced recently: viz. that it does not ‘do’ theory.80 Indeed, on a generic 
level, the debates as to the utility of a unifying theory is one that has raged in Intelligence 
Studies for years now.81 Coker relishes such debates and rarely shies away from a fight. In 
highlighting the evolutionary complexity and unpredictability of war, Coker demonstrates 
why airbrushing reality is deeply counterproductive. ‘Trend analysis is the only method we 
have of anticipating future trends within’ Clausewitz’s conceptual framework.82 The IC needs 
to engage with interpretations of alternative trends, and pinpoint the degrees of plausibility of 
its evaluations, so that policy makers do not overestimate the degree to which the evidence 
supports the conclusions. This will clash with what Robert Jervis terms ‘[the policymaker’s] 
desire for greater certainty and the intelligence business model which now thrives on speed 
more than accuracy’.83 For US intelligence professionals, attempting to fit all the required 
information into, for example, the (US) President’s Daily Brief (PDB),84 is certainly an 
Olympian task. But Coker makes a good case for the utility of evolutionary theory in dealing 
with such assignments. Indeed, such an analytical tool could well assist the US IC in 
achieving its central mission task – of ‘speaking truth unto power’ - more effectively.  
 
The misguided notion that innovations like ‘big data’, the RMA and ‘full-dimensional 
protection’, have rendered Clausewitzian thought obsolete is thoroughly discredited by 
Coker. The misunderstandings arising out of the impact of these developments upon 
fundamentals such as the nature of war, and the character of conflict, are obviously a cause 
of some irritation for Coker. Coker is but the latest of a long line of scholars to lament the 
repeated misinterpretations of Clausewitz. As Basil Liddell Hart, for instance, noted:   
 
As so often happens, Clausewitz’s disciples carried his teaching to an 
extreme which their master had not intended...[his] theory of war was 
expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, 
essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument - which often 
turned back from the direction in which it was apparently leading. 
Impressed yet befogged, they grasped at his vivid leading phrases, seeing 
only their surface meaning, and missing the deeper current of his thought.85  
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To rebut such wrongheadedness Coker invokes certain concepts - e.g. Clausewitz’s concept 
of the ‘fog of war’ - to demonstrate the timelessness of On War. (And Coker’s Clausewitz 
reminds us, that ‘no state goes down without a fight for fear of losing its soul’).86 How to win 
efficiently is, Coker asserts, something the US military has largely forgotten how to do. Its 
military culture is, in terms of the grasp of basics in classical strategy, simply inadequate. 
Coker lambasts the ‘a-strategic’ nature of US military culture and demonstrates Clausewitz’s 
point with a Darwinian breakdown of the social complexity of the post-2003 conflict in Iraq, 
and the development of the resistance forces there. This analysis culminates in a damning 
indictment of US policy which, however unwittingly, ‘created [the] conditions in which the 
seeds of Islamic State [ISIS] were sown’.87 
 
In war, it is axiomatic to declare that good intelligence is a prerequisite of victory. (Although 
when victory is attained with limited or no evidence of intelligence activity, its influence is 
often assumed). Contrary to popular misconceptions Clausewitz was intensely aware of the 
value of intelligence at all levels, but he was famously also highly sceptical of the accuracy of 
a large proportion of military intelligence. That this was so, was generally derived from 
phenomena that Clausewitz termed the ‘fog of war’ and ‘friction’. It is in response to these 
two negatives that Clausewitz develops his concept of ‘military genius’.88 This, naturally, is 
of great advantage in the realm of how leaders use intelligence.89 For Clausewitz, ‘military 
genius’ is not just a matter of intellect but, rather, an admixture of intellect with personality, 
courage, experience, personality, and temperament. If sufficient of these qualities are present 
in sufficient quantity, then one might be able to nullify the effects of the ‘fog of war’ and 
‘friction’.90 Clausewitz’s forceful argues forcefully that ‘friction’ will always create 
significant difficulties for the implementation of any war plan, whilst the ‘fog of war’ will 
always hinder commanders in their attempts to get a picture of what is happening.91 
 
Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and 
most are uncertain. What can one reasonably ask of officer is that he should 
possess a standard if judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of 
men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws 
of probability. These are difficult enough to apply when plans are drafted in 
an office, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes infinitely harder 
in the thick of fighting itself, with reports streaming in. At such times one is 
lucky if their contradictions cancel each other out, and leave a kind of 
balance to be critically assessed. It is much worse for the novice if chance 
does not help him in that way, and on the contrary one report tallies with 
another, confirms it, magnifies it, lends it color, till he has to make a quick 
decision – which is soon recognized to be mistaken, just as the reports turn 
out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on. In short, most intelligence is 
false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies inaccuracies.92  
 
Even so, such suspicious remarks were written in relation to intelligence at the tactical and 
operational levels. At the strategic and political levels, by contrast, Clausewitz repeatedly 
reiterated the absolute necessity of (high-level) political and strategic and political 
intelligence. Naturally, Clausewitz’s writings were based on his own experiences as a soldier, 
and one should recall that his Prussian army was inferior to the contemporary French army in 
military intelligence,93 as in virtually every respect, due not least to the ‘systemic’ approach 
of Napoleonic warfare.94 Thus, while Clausewitz is sometimes accused of disregarding 
intelligence, this is simply not true. (He did, however, note its limitations in his day – many 
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of which have been overcome since, not least by advances in technology).95 Loch Johnson 
recently observed that Clausewitz’s observation that most intelligence reports were 
‘contradictory’, ‘false’ and ‘uncertain’ was entirely ‘prescient’. Indeed, ‘[t]he same is true in 
times of peace’: a ‘reality about the limits of intelligence woven like a dark thread through 
[the study of intelligence].’96 General Flynn was therefore singing from the same hymn sheet 
as Clausewitz when he aimed for population-centric information. Such sources may offer 
‘few clues about where to find insurgents’, but they will ‘provide elements of ever great 
strategic importance – a map for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency 
itself’.97 Matt C. Zeller, a US Army veteran of the post-2001 Afghan War, pithily terms 
counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare as ‘a thinking man’s fight’.98 Such a moniker leads us 
directly to Clausewitz. Above all, Clausewitz instils in one a strong impulse to think about 
war. 
 
In chapter five of Rebooting Clausewitz, which relates the narrative of the meeting of the 
Military History Circle in London, Coker’s Clausewitz considers fighting contemporary wars 
by means of a discussion of the most productive way to read military history. In the light of 
Coker’s previous arguments, the ‘human space’ in war is deemed preeminent here. Getting to 
grips with moral conundrums, such as the ones we inevitably face in war, ‘involves, at least 
in part, locating [their] historical source… and to take seriously the deeply contingent nature 
of the tradition that we call “the ethics of war”’. Coker has little time for approaches that 
reduce the conduct of war to simple perceptions about power that ‘raid’ history merely for 
justificatory data. Context is everything, as it helps us attach value to the elements of the 
trinity of reason, passion, and chance.99 In and of itself, ‘big data’ collection cannot shed 
adequate light on emerging (and accelerating) patterns of social dynamism. This is the central 
problem with the Western way of war today. Pentagon planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
for example, typified the flawed thought process whereby such powerful institutions think 
they have re-invented and tamed war.100 
 
A truth all too often lost on the Pentagon and other strategists in the US is that other nations 
(and cultures) still fight differently from the Western (or the American) way of war. (The 
dreaded phenomenon of ‘mirror-imaging’, as ever, remains a potentially deadly pitfall).101 As 
war constantly mutates, vain attempts at disciplinary ‘gate-keeping’ of the definitions of the 
‘meaning of war’ will only put one at a potentially-lethal disadvantage. The idea of ‘new 
wars’ is based on such a fallacy, detracting from the complexity of the phenomenon of war 
itself.  Once you start demarcating forms of ‘knowledge’, dismissing groups such as the 
Islamic State (ISIS) as a throwback to the Medieval era becomes all too easy (as the United 
States learned to its cost in Vietnam; and the Soviets did similarly in Afghanistan). In today’s 
turbulent and increasingly fractured world, digesting military history teaches us not to 
underestimate one’s enemies. As US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated 
in 2014:  
 
What we didn’t do was predict the will [of the Islamic State] to fight. That’s 
always a problem. We didn’t do it in Vietnam. We underestimated the Viet 
Cong and the North Vietnamese and overestimated the will of the South 
Vietnamese. In this case, we underestimated ISIL [the Islamic State] and 
overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army. . .I didn’t see the 
collapse of the Iraqi security force in the north coming. I didn’t see that. It 
boils down to predicting the will to fight, which is an imponderable.102  
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Clausewitz knew only too well of such potential pitfalls in war - and his insights here typify 
the soundness of the philosophical tenets with which he sought to understand war. In his 
‘Testimonial’, one passage would have resonated particularly with the Viet Cong or the 
(Kurdish) Peshmerga as Clausewitz identified ‘[f]ighting for the fatherland’ as the soldier’s 
greatest motivation.  And, as an analysis of the nature of asymmetric war it is hard to dissent 
from Clausewitz’s view that ‘[t]he history of our times demonstrates to us that the most 
forceful war can be waged with little money; but only with a great deal of courage and good 
will.’103 
 
In the final chapter of Rebooting Clausewitz, Coker briefly compares the Prussian thinker to 
Thucydides and Sun Tzu. This short chapter provides valuable food for thought with 
Thucydides’ scoring some points over Clausewitz. What unites the Athenian and the Prussian 
is their shared emphasis on the centrality of emotions in war. And, in this, Coker’s Rebooting 
Clausewitz comes full circle. Admittedly, Coker’s intellectual achievement with Rebooting 
Clausewitz comes at the price of some distortion.104 A case in point being the adoption of an 
ambiguous view of Clausewitz on the issue of victory. Traditional takes on Clausewitz’s view 
of victory have argued that he more focused on military victory than anything else. Indeed, 
Coker himself has written that ‘Clausewitz tended to ascribe success and failure in war to 
decisive battlefield encounters, and to attribute victory or defeat to the genius of a particular 
general’.105 But, in truth, Clausewitz’s views on this subject continued to evolve throughout 
his life. Coker has a thought-provoking but brief discussion on Clausewitz’s Eurocentrism, 
and this could have been expanded. It is interesting to read that Clausewitz was not 
Eurocentric in the sense that ‘he did not postulate an unchanging Western way of war’.106 
This raises the question of Eurocentrism. In this ever-evolving (Western) ‘Way of War’, the 
question is whether the non-West can have any real impact and/or agency. Such a question is 
compatible with the Clausewitzian framework as set out here, and raises intriguing matters 
for future research.107 
 
The four pieces comprising Clausewitz and Small War (‘Lectures on Small War’ (1810-1); 
the Bekenntnisdenkschrift (1812); on the Landwehr (1819); and on Volksbewaffnung (1832)) 
mirror the evolution of Clausewitz’s thinking on the national security needs of Prussia in the 
last two decades of his life. The Napoleonic era had seen Europe shift from the limited wars 
of the era of Frederick the Great (r. 1740-86) to national wars.108 It was this change that 
prompted Clausewitz to observe of the French revolutionary armies:  
 
Suddenly war again became the business of the people – a people of thirty 
millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens…The people 
became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as 
heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The 
resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional 
limits; nothing now impeded the vigour with which war could be waged, 
and consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.109   
 
Following the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806 Clausewitz increasingly focused on the 
evolving role of the people in war - a subject that form a major contributory factor in his 
developing model of the trinity. In a 2017 review of Clausewitz on Small War, Timothy D. 
Hoyt opined that the book itself offered ‘a metaphor for Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity.’ 
 
In these translations we see Clausewitz the officer, Clausewitz the patriot, 
and Clausewitz the scholar/analyst – a personal manifestation of the forces 
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of chance, accident and probability (nested largely in the military), 
primordial violence, hatred and enmity (found largely in the people), and 
rationality (found in the political leadership). The trinity, in turn, provides 
the foundations for his discussions of how and why the character of war can 
and has (in his time) changed.110  
 
In the wake of Napoleon’s innovations, the theory of war espoused in Clausewitz’s On War 
was undoubtedly a response to contemporary developments in mathematics and philosophy, 
and the tools for solving military problems - maps, war games, simulations, and the like - 
became models for how to manage chance.111 And, ever since 1932, contemporary debates 
over the continued relevance of Clausewitz have many antecedents. And such debates will 
undoubtedly continue.112 One of the most eminent of Clausewitz scholars, Peter Paret, has 
argued that it is not the case ‘that one must be a historian of his period or a biographer of his 
life to be critically receptive of his work in its final state – the reaction Clausewitz hoped for 
from his readers.’113 In his introduction to Clausewitz and Small War, James W. Davis 
observes that:  
 
Ultimately, [for Clausewitz] war is an act of violence (Gewalt) intended to 
compel the enemy to submit to a foreign will.114 A close reading of 
Clausewitz’s writings on Small War leads to the conclusion that he did not 
have a fixed conception of the political organizations that might adopt 
means or of the form the ensuing clash of wills would take. Rather, it is that 
which unifies warfare despite the diversity of its empirical forms that 
interested him.115 
 
In today’s world, Clausewitz’s belief in the utility of force (or at least an acceptance that it is 
the way things are), and of the necessity of keeping political and military goals in close 
alignment continues to shape international politics.116 And make no mistake about it – even 
for the United States the idea of exactly how to use its overwhelming military power is 
problematic.117 (A 2014 book by Coker even posed the question as to whether war could be 
abolished).118 In Rebooting Clasuewitz, Coker makes his case for the enduring legacy of 
Clausewitz with verve and passion. Rebooting Clausewitz is packed with insightful nuggets, 
for both the advanced reader and the uninitiated individual (although it is obviously written 
with an eye to undergraduate students of war, strategy and military history). It will serve 
those seeking to understand Clausewitz particularly well. This is important not least because 
it is with good reason that Clausewitz remains required reading in military academies and 
universities worldwide.119  
 
Historically, part of the problems with the interpretation of Clausewitz lies in the expectations 
of his readers prior to studying him. And Clausewitz, more than most philosopher 
intellectuals, can be read in a number of different ways. It is, for instance, not uncommon for 
On War to be labelled as a primarily normative text. In doing this, one will most likely come 
to deem Clausewitz’s theories as the basis of what one should do in any war. On War can 
also be read, of course, as a descriptive document. In this scenario On War is supposed to 
make the reader understand that, if Clausewitz’s most famous dictum (about war being ‘a 
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’)120 is treated as irrefutable 
fact, it will soon lead ‘to the conclusion that On War is first and foremost an effort to uncover 
objective knowledge about the phenomenon of war rather than as a primer on military, let 
alone political, strategy.’121 For Timothy Hoyt the case Clausewitz’s continuing relevance is 
clear. 
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[Clausewitz’s] discernment of the power of a people in arms, mobilized by 
patriotism or ideology and willing to make great sacrifices to achieve 
victory, should be fundamental for those considering wars that will require 
occupation. Clausewitz’s critics, as always, will argue that because he does 
not provide simple answers to specific complex contemporary problems, he 
has nothing to offer. The fact that the United States has, in this century, 
pursued two wars of unlimited aims (with the explicit objective of 
overthrowing an existing regime), and then faced the quandary of 
counterinsurgency and state building, should suggest that Clausewitz is as 
relevant to strategic calculations today as ever.122 
 
In Rebooting Clausewitz Coker made the central mission of this book the demonstration that 
war evolves ‘in sync’ with humanity, not least because war is the ultimate human activity.123 
(Or, as Thucydides termed it, the ‘human thing’).124 Any theory of war, as Coker maintains 
throughout his volume, ‘must never lose sight of the human dimension of life’.125 Indicative 
of his concurrence on this point of necessity, Clausewitz wrote in his ‘Testimonial’: 
 
It is commonly held that the enemy can deprive us of the necessary courage 
through cruel treatment of captured insurgents, through the death penalty, 
etc. But what an unnecessary concern! As if we could not be as cruel as the 
enemy, as if the enemy would not consist of flesh and blood! The enemy 
will indeed try to use such means, and the war will rapidly acquire a 
barbarous quality. But to whose disadvantage? Obviously to the 
disadvantage of those who can put fewer lives on the line, who fight with 
standing armies! So let us take our chances and answer cruelty with cruelty, 
respond to atrocities with atrocity. It would be easy for us to exceed the 
enemy and to force him back into the bounds of moderation and 
humanity.126 
 
In a previous book Coker asked, ‘how can we even aspire to peace if we cannot reliably know 
what other people hold most dear?’127 China’s military and security agenda, naturally, attracts 
a great deal of attention in the West (as US DNI Clapper observed in 2014: ‘I’m looking at 
what I find [to be] impressive and disturbing programs, across the board, which the Chinese 
have embarked on to modernize their military in all branches and all realms, including cyber 
and space. It’s very impressive what they’re doing.’)128 In China itself persistent interest in 
the ‘masters’ of Western strategic thought means that Rebooting Clausewitz was published in 
Chinese in 2018.129 Small wonder: the Chinese, just like everyone else, want to read the latest 
primer on Clausewitz for the twenty-first century. 
 
R. Gerald Hughes © 2017 
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